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Abstract
To effectively participate in modern collaborations, 
member organizations must be able to share specific data 
and functionality with collaboration partners, while 
ensuring their resources are safe from inappropriate 
access. This requires access control models, policies, and 
enforcement mechanisms for the shared resources. This 
paper specifically addresses how to reduce the 
information leaks caused by authorization policies used in 
collaborative computing environment. The basic principle 
is defining some labels that specify the information flow 
constraints, and assigning them to authorization policy 
components. The usages of labeled policy components 
must obey the information flows constraints defined by the 
labels in order to avoid authorization policy components 
being misused. This label can also improve the 
authorization policy administration.  
1. Introduction 
With the advent of the information superhighway, 
businesses, governments and other organizations 
cooperate in innovative ways. To effectively participate in 
modern collaborations, member organizations must be 
able to share specific data and functionality with 
collaboration partners, while ensuring their resources are 
safe from inappropriate access. Such collaborations may 
dynamically change participants and trust relationships 
during the life cycle. The dynamic and multi-institutional 
nature of these environments introduces challenging 
security issues that demand new technical approaches for 
authorization policy enforcement and management. In this 
paper we specifically address the following problem: how 
to enhance the normal access control policy enforcement 
and management to reduce information leaks in the 
collaborative computing environment. 
In this paper we proposal a Label-Based Access 
Control Policy (LBACP) model that can be used for 
access control policies management and enforcement in 
the collaborative computing environment. The basic idea 
of LBACP is placing another layer on the top of normal 
access control policies, i.e. add labels to the policy 
components. Labels are used to define the information 
flow. For example, add a label to the “Engineer role” used 
in a collaborative environment, through modifying the 
label definition, this role can only be used in some of the 
partner organizations, but the access control policies do 
not need to be changed. Each policy component can have 
one or more associated labels.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 
introduces the label model and its basic operations. 
Section 3 describes label assignment and information 
flow. Section 4 investigates label policy for access control 
and policy management. Section 5 compares our work to 
some related works. Finally, section 6 gives the 
conclusion and future work. 
2. Label model 
2.1. Label structure 
In the LBACP model there are three essential 
elements: contexts, label polices and labels. Contexts are 
the entities whose privacy is protected by the model, label 
policies are the ways that principals express their privacy 
concerns, and labels are composed with a set of label 
policies. Information is owned by, updated by, and 
released to contexts, which are the basic elements in the 
LBACP model. For example, the departments and groups 
at a university could be modeled as contexts. A label 
policy has three parts: an owner context, a set of import 
contexts and a set of export contexts. The owner context is 
a context whose data was observed. The import contexts 
are a set of contexts, from which the owner context 
accepts information flow. The export contexts are a set of 
contexts, to which the owner context allows information 
flow. Note that the notion of context used in this approach 
does not refer to dynamic environment parameters.  
One label may contain multiple label policies. The 
intuitive meaning of a label is that every policy in the 
label must be obeyed as data flows through the system, so 
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labeled information is permitted to flow in or out only by 
the consensus of all the policies. The information may 
flow to a context only when this context is in export 
contexts for every policy in the label. The information 
may flow from a context only when this context is in 
import contexts for every policy in the label. Because the 
intersection of all of the policies is enforced, adding more 
policies to a label only restricts the propagation of the 
labeled data. 
An example of an expression that denotes a label L
with two label policies is the following: L = {o1 : i1, i2 : e1,
e2 ; o2 : i2, i3 : e2, e3}, where o1, o2, i1, i2, i3, e1, e2, e3
denote contexts. Semicolon separates two policies within 
the label. The owners of these policies are o1 and o2. The 
import sets for the policies are {i1, i2} and {i2, i3},
respectively. The export sets for the policies are {e1, e2}
and {e2, e3}, respectively. The import context set of the 
label is {i2}, and the export context set is {e2}.
2.2. Information flow definition 
2.2.1. Information flow between label policies. If P is a 
label policy, then the notation o(P) denotes the policy 
owner, the notation i(P) denotes the set of import 
contexts, the notation e(P) denotes the set of export 
contexts. If I and J are two label policies and C represents 
the set of all contexts, the information flow between them 
is defined as: 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ?CJiJiIoCIeIeJoJIJI ????????????
2.2.2. Information flow between labels. If L is a label, 
then lo(L) denotes the union of the owner contexts, the 
li(L) denotes the intersection of the import contexts of all 
the label policies, and the le(L) denotes the intersection of 
the export contexts of all the label policies. In one label, 
one label policy cannot block other owners’ information 
flow, i.e., information can freely flow among the owner 
contexts in one label, but it can block other owners’ 
import and export information flow. Reason for this is 
because the labeled resource is owned by them together. 
If L1 and L2 are two labels, the information flow between 
them is defined as: 
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?21212121 LliLloLloLleLLLL ???????
2.2.3. Information flow channel between labels. In the 
real application we more concern about information 
channel between two labels. A channel is composed with 
input channel and output channel. Input channel describes 
which contexts are the source contexts of a channel. 
Output channel describes which contexts are the target 
contexts of a channel. Information can flow from any 
input channel context to any output channel context. If L1
and L2 are two labels, and the information flow direction 
is from L1 to L2, then the input channel, output channel 
and information channel are defined as: 
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? channel_outputchannel_inputLLchanneln_informatio
LloLleLLchannel_output
LliLloLLchannel_input
,,
,
,
?
??
?
?
?
21
2121
2121
For example, B2B, VRC, WMG and IARC are four 
contexts, L1 and L2 are two labels defined as follow: 
? ?
? ?IARCB2BIARCB2BVRCL
VRCVRCWMGVRCVRCBBL
,:,:
::;::2
2
1
?
?
The information channel calculation process from L1 to 
L2 can be described as follow: 
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?VRCB2BLLchannel_ninformatio
VRCLLchannel_output
BBLLchannel_input
IARCB2BVRCLli
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WMGB2BLlo
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2.3. Label composing 
In our model one policy component can be assigned 
with multiple labels. This section describes the syntax of 
the label composition algebra that consists of a collection 
of labels, a collection of operators to combine them. Label 
composition operators in our algebra are disjunction and 
conjunction, and separation. Accordingly, for disjunction 
and conjunction, operations on labels are interpreted as 
relational operators such as union and intersection. The 
separation simply specifies there is no any relation among 
labels. 
Disjunction operator permits accesses that are allowed 
under either of its components, i.e. disjunction merges 
two labels by returning their union. Formally, 
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
???
?
???
?
????
????
??
21
21
21
21
LoOLoO|
OKo,LKLK|Ke
,OKo,LKLK|Ki,O
LL ?
?
An example of label union is show as follow: 
? ?
? ?
? ?IARCVRCIMRCVRCWMGIARCVRCIMRCVRCBBLL
IARCVRCVRCWMGL
VRCIMRCVRCBBL
,:,:;,:,:2
,::
:,:2
21
2
1
??
?
?
For instance, there is a portal manages a virtual 
organization that manages a dynamic collection of 
resources and users from different organizations. Access 
to this portal can be authorized by any of the 
administrators of different participant organizations, and 
such information can be organized into labels that 
describe the valid users’ domains. The totality of the 
accesses through the portal to be authorized should then 
be the union of the statements of each organization. 
Intuitively, disjunction can be applied in any situation 
where accesses can be authorized if allowed by any of the 
component policies. 
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Conjunction operator allows only those permitted by 
both components, i.e. conjunction merges two labels by 
returning their intersection. Formally, 
? ? ? ??
? ? ? ??
? ? ? ? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
???
?
???
?
????
????
??
21
21
21
21
LoOLoO|
OKo,LKLK|Ke
,OKo,LKLK|Ki,O
LL ?
? ?
?
?
For the two labels used in the label disjunction part, the 
intersection of the two labels is: 
? VRCVRCWMGVRCVRCBBLL ::;::221 ??
Disjunction allows an access if any of the component 
policies allows it, whereas conjunction requires all the 
component policies to agree on the fact that the access 
should be granted. Intuitively, although disjunction 
enforces maximum privilege, conjunction enforces 
minimum privilege. For instance, consider a virtual 
organization in which participant organizations share 
certain documents (e.g., clinical folders of patients). An 
access to a document may be allowed only if all the 
authorities that have a say on the document agree on it, 
i.e. whether this document is permitted flow to some 
contexts. 
Separation operator allows multiple labels can be 
assigned to a component, but among of them there is no 
any relation. At runtime, only one of them is used for a 
particular access control. This separation also allows 
system administrators manage access control policies in 
multiple dimensions. Formally, 
21
For example, there is a set of rules for the access 
control of patients’ information in a hospital, which may 
be assigned with label L
LL ;
surgery, or Lmedicine, or both of them, 
but separated with the separation operator. At runtime the 
access control engine may only use the rules labelled with 
Lsurgery or Lmedicine for a particular access control. 
3. Label assignment and information flow 
We introduced labels in order to annotate access 
control policy components with them. To enable fine-
grained information flow restrictions, we allow label 
specification to access control policies at different levels, 
i.e. assign labels to rule elements, rules and policies. The 
labeled entities have to conform to the information flow 
constraints specified by the labels. For example, a labeled 
“role” in a RBAC policy can only be used in the specified 
contexts. Some label calculation must be followed in 
order to avoid information leaks. A policy component 
without labels means it does not care the information flow 
constraint. 
In a labeled policy, the information flow direction is 
from lower level (e.g. rule element) to higher level (e.g. 
rule), from rule predicates to rule body. The checking 
process includes two steps. Firstly getting an information 
channel, and then checking if the labeled entities can flow 
through this channel. If the available channel is narrow, it 
means the access control is more restricted. Each label has 
its applicable scope, if a role is labeled in the definition 
part, the label will affect all the role scope. If a role is 
labeled in a rule, the label only affects within this rule. 
To illustrate our approach, we specify authorization 
policy using the Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF) 
[1] that is a logic-based framework in specifying 
authorizations in the form of rules. The access control 
policies are modeled through rules which are expressed 
by access predicates. In FAF, if p is a predicate with arity 
n, and t1, …, tn are terms appropriate for p, then p(t1, …, 
tn) is an atom. An atom is denoted with word literal. For 
example, auth(s, o, +a) is a literal, s, o and a are terms. A 
rule can also be a predicate of another rule. An 
authorization rule can be defined as the form: 
? ? nP&...&Pasign,o,sauth 1?
Where s, o, and a are elements of subject, object and 
action respectively, n ? 0, <sign> is either + or -, and 
P1,…, Pn are the predicates. In this paper, if a literal is a 
rule predicate, we call it rule predicate, its terms are called 
rule predicate elements, otherwise it is called rule, and its 
term is call rule element. Some authorization rules 
described in FAF are: 
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? AOH,Document,fin&ASH,Manager,sinwrite,f,scando
AOH,Document,fin&ASH,Staff,sinread,f,scando
AOH,Document,filein
AOH,Document,filein
ASH,Manager,Johnin
ASH,Staff,Maryin
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
2
1
The first four rules consist of information about subject 
and object hierarchies, and the next two rules describe 
how accesses propagate along these hierarchies. ASH and 
AOH denote authorization subject and object hierarchies 
respectively. ASH consists of two roles Staff and 
Manager. Mary has a role of Staff, and John has a role of 
Manager. The object hierarchy AOH has one class 
Document with members of file1 and file2. The two cando
rules specify that all employees with a role Staff are 
allowed to read files and only managers are allowed to 
write these files. 
3.1. Label specification for literal elements 
The rule elements and rule predicate elements can all 
be assigned with labels. An example of rule element label 
assignment is as follow: 
? ? ? ? ? ?AOH,Document,fin&ASH,Staff,userinread,f,usercando LL 12 ??
L1 is a label assigned to the rule predicate element user.
If lo(L1)={“School of Engineering”}, and li(L1)={
“School of Engineering”, “Computer Science 
Department”}, it means only the users from “School of 
Engineering” and “Computer Science Department” are the 
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valid users for this rule predicate. L2 is a label assigned to 
the rule element f. If lo(L2)={ “School of Engineering”}, 
and le(L2)={ “School of Engineering”, “Computer 
Science Department.Security Group”}, it means the object 
f can only be used in the “School of Engineering” and 
“Security Group” of Computer Science Department. 
These information flow constraint for this variable will 
automatically propagate to the whole rule scope. If there 
is more than one label assigned to the same variable in 
different literals, the information flow channel of this 
variable is the intersection of these labels. According to 
this definition, the label information flow control for the 
next three rules is same. 
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? AOHDocumentfinASHStaffuserinreadfusercando
AOHDocumentfinASHStaffuserinreadfusercando
AOHDocumentfinASHStaffuserinreadfusercando
LL
L
L
,,&,,,,
,,&,,,,
,,&,,,,
11
1
1
??
??
??
?
?
If an object or action labeled, for example 
in ? ?read,f,usercando L ?2 , the constraint of L2 will 
automatically propagate to the action, i.e. the +read. If 
both of them are labeled, then the valid information flow 
is their intersection. This rule also suits the subject and 
object hierarchy, for example, the Staff and ASH in the 
above example. The information flow check among the 
elements in a literal is if the information can flow from the 
subject to other elements, for example, if the subject s can 
flow to the permission (o, <sign>a), or to the role(r,
ASH). For a literal ? ?read,f,usercando LL ?21 , the system will 
check if the information can flow from L1 to L2.
3.2. Label specification for literals 
A literal can be assigned with labels, for example,  
? ?ASH,Staff,userin LL 12
In this case, the information flow check is if the 
information can flow from L1 to L2. A valid information 
flow should satisfy the checking process of 
? ? ? ?
? ?21
21
,
,
LLnelinput_chan
usercontextLLn_channelinformatio ????
?usercontext ?
AOHDocumentfinASHStaffuserinreadfusercando LL ,,&,,,, 12 ??
?
 is a function to get a user’s context. If 
his context does belong to the information input channel, 
then this rule is not valid for him. There is no information 
flow check among the labels assigned to predicate literals. 
If both rule body and predicate literals are labeled, the 
information flow check is if the information can flow 
from the labels assigned to predicate literals to the labels 
assigned to the target literal. For example, a rule as 
follow: 
? ? ? ? ? ?
The system needs to check if information can flow 
from L1 to L2. If the information flow is not permitted, it 
means the predicate literal is not valid, and further this 
rule is not a valid rule. 
3.3. Label specification for rules 
The whole rule can be assigned with labels. In this 
case, the information flow check is if the information can 
flow from its inside labels to the rule labels. For example, 
? ? ?
? ?
2
1
,,
&,,,,
LL
AOHDocumentfin
ASHStaffuserinreadfusercando
???
?
???
? ??
The system needs to check if information can flow 
from L1 to L2. If the information flow is not permitted, it 
means this rule is not valid. 
3.4. Label specification for policies 
A policy can be assigned with labels. In this case the 
information flow check is if the information can flow 
form its inside labels to the policy labels. For example, 
? ?nLL rulerulerulepolicy ,...,, 21 12 ?
The system needs to check if information can flow 
from L1 to L2. If the information flow is not permitted, it 
means this policy is not valid. 
3.5. Label policy checking process 
The label policy checking process can be from top to 
bottom, i.e. from policy labels to literal element labels, or 
from bottom to top, i.e. from literal element labels to 
policy labels. In any checking route, the available 
information flow channel will become narrower, in other 
words, become stricter. At runtime the information flow 
check can be done before or after an access control rule 
check, adopting which way will depend on system 
implementation. 
4. Label policy for access control and policy 
management
In this section we will discussion how the LBACP can 
be used both for access control and policy management 
through some examples. Compare to the system-oriented 
normal access control policy the label-based access 
control policy is more application-oriented. The label 
policy can be used by both system administrators and 
normal application users, this is because the label policies 
can be assigned to access control policy components at 
different levels, for example, assign a labels to rule 
elements or to rules. With the help of analyze tools, access 
control policies can be viewed based assigned label 
policies. 
Consider an example of a RBAC system in an IT 
company. There are two departments, one is 
“Development department”, and another is “Test 
department”. The “Project 1” is in the developing stage, 
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and needs to be assigned to “Development department”; 
“Project 2” is in the testing stage, and needs to be 
assigned to “Test department”. We assume the system 
administrator defines a rule that allows the employees 
with “Software Engineer” role can access all the 
developing projects and testing projects, and all the 
employees in both departments have this role. Then he 
defines two labels, one permits information flowing to 
“Development department”, and assigns it to the “Project 
1”; the other permits information flowing to “Test 
department”, and assigns it to “Project 2”. At runtime, the 
access control engine will check the RBAC policies and 
the label policies, and then decides which project should 
be accessed by the users form which departments. When 
“Project 1” is finished, and needs to be tested, it can be 
relabeled so that only the user with “Software Engineer” 
in “Test Department” can access it. If it is necessary, this 
project can be relabeled back to “Development 
Department”. This labeling process is obviously easier 
than changing the access control policies and also less 
error prone. The label policy can also reduce the number 
of role definition in a RBAC system, for example, we do 
not need to create a “Test engineer” role for “Test 
department” in this example. 
Structuring introduced by labels allows administrators 
to work with a smaller number of policy components.  For 
example, consider a hospital composed of three 
departments, namely, “Radiology”, “Surgery”, and 
“Medicine”. Each of the departments is responsible for 
granting access to data under their (possibly overlapping) 
authority domains, where domains are specified by a 
scoping restriction, i.e. labels. With the help of label 
polices, the administrators can get a clear static view 
about the subjects, objects and actions relationships in a 
department. This function can also be implemented 
through define many special roles for different 
departments and assign permission to these roles, but 
define too many roles will bring out management 
problems, and these roles still need to be grouped in order 
to get a management view about each department. 
Through the roles indirectly managing the resources and 
users sometimes cannot easily give a clear view about 
which resource can be shared with other departments. 
By annotating policy components with labels we can 
form policy component groups for the purposes of access 
control and policy management. Policy components may 
be marked with multi labels that do not have any relation 
(through label separation), thus allowing administrators to 
group policy components according to various dimensions 
(applications). This allows different views to a policy, and 
this can be exploited in policy visualization. The label 
policies can segregate of unrelated policy components, for 
example, only some rules labeled with a specified label 
are used for make an access control decision. 
Virtual Organization (VO) is a dynamic collection of 
resources and users unified by a common goal and 
potentially spanning multiple administrative domains [2]. 
VO may apply some common policies about how its users 
access the resources assigned to the VO, but each 
organization will typically retain ultimate control over the 
policies that govern access to its resources. The dynamic 
and multi-institutional nature of these environments 
introduces challenging security issues that demand new 
technical approaches. Since VO resources and users are 
located within multiple organizations, a key problem 
associated with the formation and operation of distributed 
virtual organizations is how to manage and enforce the 
common and local policies. One VO many involves many 
participant organizations, and one organization may 
participate many different VOs. We will describe how 
these issues are addressed by our label-based access 
control policy. In our label-based access control policy 
solution, the VO will define a set of roles contractually 
agreed by the participant organizations. The common VO 
policies are RBAC policies, but do not specify any 
domain related information. The domain related 
information is described in the label policies, for example, 
which roles can be used in which participant 
organizations. For the resources providers, they can use 
the label policies to define which resources are provided 
to which VO, and which roles are permitted to access its 
resources.
5. Related works 
There are two important related works. One is the 
decentralized label model developed by Myers et al. [3, 
4], the other is an OASIS RBAC meta-policy approach 
for subdividing the administration of large-scale security 
environments and for enforcing information flow 
restrictions over policies presented by Belokosztolszki et 
al [5, 6]. 
Decentralized label model is a model of information 
flow control that protects private data while allowing the 
applications to share data. In their approach the label 
model is decentralized: it allows cooperative computation 
by mutually distrusting principals, without mediation by 
highly trusted agents. The decentralized label model 
permits programs using it to be checked statically to avoid 
information leaks. This model also presents a new 
language JFlow that is an extension to the Java 
programming language. Variable declarations in JFlow 
programs are annotated with labels that allow the static 
checker to check programs for information leaks 
efficiently, in a manner similar to type checking. 
There are two major differences between the 
decentralized label model and LBACP. The first 
difference is the label structure. In decentralized label 
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model the system does not care where the information 
from, so the label only includes the owner and reader 
information. Whereas in LBACP it is important to check 
the information sources, so the label structure includes the 
information sources specification. The second difference 
is in decentralized label model labels are assigned to 
variables of Java programs in order to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of information manipulated 
by the computing system. In LBACP labels are assigned 
to the access control policy components in order to 
confine their usages, it specifies high level access control 
strategy and program languages independent. 
The OASIS RBAC meta-policy is an approach to 
control information flow in and out of the OASIS RBAC 
system. This approach introduces the concept of 
“contexts” to group and classify policy components 
according to various aspects. These contexts are applied 
to control information flows between system entities. 
With the help of information flow relation administrators 
can restrict the use of policy components alongside 
components belonging to certain other groups, and 
organize access control policies into a hierarchical, 
multidimensional structure.  
There are two major differences between OASIS 
RBAC meta-policy and LBACP. In OASIS RBAC meta-
policy there is no real label structure, it simply assigns the 
context names to the policy components, this directly 
assignment makes it difficult to provide flexible policy 
management in multidimensional way as they hope. 
Whereas in LBACP, there is a clear label structure 
specifying the owner, import and export contexts 
information, and one component can be assigned with 
multiple labels. This design provides a real flexible way 
for policy management in different levels and different 
ways. The second difference is the OASIS RBAC meta-
policies are not directly used for access control but 
describe and restrict policies at policy specification time. 
On the contrary, the LBACP is tightly connects to the 
access control policies, it must be checked before or after 
access control policies checking process. The LBACP 
specifically address the issue of information flow relations 
among the entities in access control policies. It can be 
seen layered on the top of the normal access control 
policies. The major benefit of this layer structure is it easy 
to deal with the situation of dynamic change relationships 
in the collaboration computing environment. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
With the LBACP we can get three major benefits. The 
first is in the collaboration environment adding new 
partners can be done through redefining the label 
information flow constraints instead of changing access 
control policies. This reduces the error prone, and suits 
the requirements of modern dynamic collaboration 
activities. The second is through defining information 
flow restrictions it can avoid a potential information leak 
made by access control policy definition errors. People 
only need to manage the information flow with other 
organizations. The third is it can improve the access 
control policy administration through policy components 
group function. Its layer structure also makes it easy to 
integrate with exist access control systems. The future 
work is mainly related to investigating the hierarchical 
label policy specification. 
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